2004 - The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act

Attribution: Ryan, James E.
Researchers: James E. Ryan
University Affiliation: Virginia University
Email: jryan@virginia.edu
Research Question:
Examines the incentives created by NCLBA
Published: 1
Journal Name or Institutional Affiliation: New York University Law Review
Journal Entry: June
Year: 2004
Findings:
  • Ryan argues that the incentives created by NCLBA actually work against student achievement in three ways;

    • 1) incentives for states to lower academic standards;

    • 2) incentives for schools to push out low performers (poor and minority students), thereby increasing class and race segregation; and

    • 3) deters teachers from working at challenging schools.

  • NCLB incentives reward affluent schools and punish poor schools. Central problem with NCLB–focuses on absolute achievement measures rather than achievement gains. The goals do not consider past achievement levels of rates of growth.
  • Ryan offers a partial solution – a value-added system of accountability would give a more accurate picture of school quality and not generate perverse incentives.
Keywords: Academic AchievementAccountabilityAchievement GapNo Child Left BehindSegregationSES CompositionRegions: NationalMethodologies: QualitativeResearch Designs: Policy AnalysisAnalysis Methods: Policy Analysis Sampling Frame:Previous Studies
Sampling Types: NonrandomAnalysis Units: DocumentData Types: Qualitative-Cross Sectional
Data Description:
  • No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA)
Theoretical Framework:
Relevance:
Archives: K-12 Integration, Desegregation, and Segregation Abstracts